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The corona crisis, the US-China great 
power competition and lacklustre 
international rules vividly demonstrate 
the vulnerability of economic 
interdependence. 
 
Interdependence is a power struggle, 
not a mutual aid society. For the vast 
benefits of a globalised economy to 
continue to outweigh its risks, policies 
to build greater resilience are 
necessary. 
 
For the EU, the unprecedented events 
also offer an opportunity to forge a new 
economic security approach to better 
manage its dependencies in strategic 
sectors. 
 
Will we be able to patch up the wounds of 
globalisation once the pandemic cedes? This 
question consumes discussions around the globe. 
But rather than patching things up, it will be more 
important to consider how we can preserve the 
best of what globalisation offers, while becoming 
better at managing its risks. 
Risks are there. The coronavirus vividly 
demonstrates this point, particularly in respect to 
globe-spanning supply chains. For example, 
states’ dependency on pharmaceutical imports 
and other critical medical supplies such as masks 
and ventilators are emblematic for the kind of 
risk human health – and by extension the state – 
faces when supply is interrupted. Even the EU 
could not prevent supply disruptions between 
Member States, causing political agitation and 
questions over EU solidarity. “Globalisation”, 
Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman remind us 
in a recent essay, “[…] creates extraordinary 
efficiencies but also extraordinary 
vulnerabilities.” 
 
THE POLITICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
The corona-shock revealed the vulnerable 
mechanism at play: an interdependent global 
economy in which individual dependencies can 
expose states to vulnerabilities should there be 
interruptions. Here the pandemic is not the only 
troublemaker. Powers can also weaponize these 
dependencies should this be in their political 
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interest. And they do it increasingly so: access to 
finance, the flow of investment, the export of 
technology, chemical inputs – or, indeed, the 
export of live saving drugs during a pandemic. 
The great powers instrumentalize everything and 
trade networks are particularly vulnerable. 
International rules, which may curb this behavior, 
have seen better days. Take the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Its ability to work – that is 
to de-politicize trade flows and settle trade brawls 
through law, not power – is in a coma. Its lifeline, 
a new multilateral compromise on all its 
functions, looks all too distant. Will the corona 
crisis embolden the global community to 
overcome their differences? One EU initiative 
provides a lifeline for the optimistically-minded. 
The crisis may however also accelerate the 
opposite trend of fragmentation and 
confrontation. 
This does not spell the end of globalization. In 
the big picture, global economic interdependence 
is here to stay. But the corona crisis is yet another 
catalyzer for the question where the balance lies 
between on the one hand the vast economic 
benefits of interdependence, and on the other 
hand states’ feeling of incapacity to defend the 
health of citizens – or other security interest it 
may have. 
This question is of course by no means new. 
Already Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations 
considered “defense […] of much more 
importance than opulence.” The defense of 
citizens’ health maybe a more obvious reason for 
states to intervene in global markets. Today, few 
politicians would disagree that we should 
minimize the risks of an interdependent economy 
for essential medical supplies, given their 
significant national security implications, even if 
such a policy means increased costs.  
Things get more complicated in other sectors, 
such as emerging technologies. Especially for 
those with a “general purpose” for civilian and 
military application. Artificial intelligence, for 
example, and its input – data – is not only 
considered as an economic opportunity, but also 
to disrupt security competition and societal 
futures. It is but one example in a ballooning list 
of strategic technologies.  
 
This strategic value, which eclipses mercantilist or 
protectionist logics, makes states less willing to 
expose themselves to the potential risks of over-
dependence on global networks – or rival 
governments. The US-China competition is 
chiefly played out the technology domain. But 
they are not the only governments to translate the 
politics of interdependence into questions of 
economic security and national security.  
 
A POWER STRUGGLE 
Interdependence is a power struggle, not a 
mutual aid society. It can, of course, also provide 
mutually beneficial outcomes when we minimize 
that struggle through rules-based global 
governance, as we have quite successfully done in 
past decades (and, with exceptions, have excelled 
at in European integration). But today’s limits to 
international compromise are glaring. Neither the 
United States nor China seem willing or able to 
take up a leadership role in forging a new 
compromise. The EU, though willing, has not 
been able for the moment to tip the scales. 
That does not mean it should renounce its quest 
for international cooperation. But the EU must 
also not be like a fish, which fails to notice the 
expansion and contraction of the ocean 
surrounding it. The EU has yet to embrace the 
role of sailing on the waves, not merely 
swimming beneath them. 
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Sailing – to use it as our analogy here – requires 
positioning the ship and considering the waters 
(and tides) it traverses. It means to position the 
EU in the rivalry between the great powers “as an 
independent actor that forges its own relations 
with each of the others”, as Sven Biscop has 
argued on numerous occasions in this Egmont 
series. To do so, the EU should advance a 
strategy of triangulation, that is to say engage one 
power without prompting the other to disengage, 
and vice versa. Not equidistance between 
Washington and Beijing, but drawing red lines, 
which can be enforced unilaterally if need be, 
with either. Be it Washington’s ballooning 
sanctions policy or Beijing’s promises, time and 
again, to provide equal market access. 
The corona pandemic is another testbed for this 
position. For the great powers, it was never just a 
health or economic crisis, but another platform 
for geopolitical jousting. Beijing’s brisk mask 
diplomacy with various EU Member States, while 
necessary and (often) appreciated, exemplify the 
geopolitics involved, when China links its 
political narrative to the medical support. Xinhua 
News, a Party mouthpiece, even threatened that 
Beijing could impose pharmaceutical export 
controls on those challenging its narrative.  
So far, China’s mask diplomacy in the EU seems 
to run aground. But we should not forget that  
it is only the latest iteration of great powers 
leveraging economic dependencies for political 
gain. Consider China’s threat to sanction German 
car exports over the latter’s possible Huawei 
exclusion, or the White House’s threat to 
sanction EU imports in response to some 
Member States’ ambitions to tax digital services. 
The list goes on – and gives substance to the 
worry over Europe’s independent decision-
making. Independence in an interdependent 
world is an illusion, of course, but this general 
truth should not blind governments from 
necessary risk mitigation.  
The EU designated Beijing as a systemic rival last 
year. But it also, rightfully, stressed cooperation as 
key to tackle global transnational challenges, 
including fighting climate change and the corona 
pandemic. A sound strategy to wither the politics 
of interdependence must juggle these two 
realities. Forgetting about the rival part over 
China’s mask diplomacy, or any other lever 
Beijing may apply, risks wrecking the EU ship on 
the rocky shores of interdependence. The 
“struggle for influence through the politics of 
generosity”, as HRVP Borrell warned, is but one 
episode in whole geoeconomic series 
characterising international politics. Put 
differently: pushing back against the corona 
narrative is a one-off remedy; systematically 
protecting EU vulnerabilities is a strategy. 
 
A NEW ECONOMIC SECURITY 
Reducing the Union’s vulnerabilities from an 
interdependent, great power world requires more 
active management of its dependencies. The EU 
should forge a new approach to economic security 
which can alert policy-makers to the geopolitical 
security risks the Union faces – not from invading 
armies but from economic dependencies for 
strategic goods and sectors.  
Risks are varied. Disruptions in the supply chain, 
compromised equipment, coercion, or the 
erosion of a strong industrial and technological 
base are examples. Some of these risks are not 
isolated economic or technological concerns but 
can spill-over into the EU’s long-term ability to 
defend and promote its interests. Where that is 
the case, economic security becomes a critical 
insurance policy. 
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That means to figure out what EU strategic goods 
and sectors comprise. No easy task in a Union of 
27. It also invites pushback for such 
interventions, even if commenced with the best 
intentions, may become protectionist and offer 
shelter for vested national interests. Welfare and 
consumer benefits may suffer at the expense of 
security. These are genuine concerns. But 
geopolitical and security considerations – health 
or otherwise – have become fully eclipsed. In this 
geoeconomic era, the EU must strike a new 
balance between economic and security 
concerns. 
The pandemic evidenced that medical supplies 
are goods whose availability in a crisis we cannot 
allow to be solely dependent on global markets or 
on governments intent on weaponizing their 
supply. The announcement to create an EU 
strategic stockpile for medical equipment and a 
new EU pharmaceutical strategy are good 
Commission initiatives to that end.  
Beyond health policy, the EU also curates a list 
for critical raw materials, for which reliable and 
unhindered access is vital to the EU economy and 
the development of digital technologies (e.g. 
cobalt for batteries). Securing and diversifying 
access to these materials in foreign markets via 
trade agreements, for example, is only one side of 
the coin. Increasing geopolitical risk to the EU’s 
heavy raw material dependency has drawn several 
EU initiatives to manage this vulnerability, 
including to shore up local production, support 
relevant technology innovation, produce better 
data over local availability, and coordinate with 
the Circular Economy Strategy. 
Horizontally, the dependency risks are also 
addressed in the recently published EU industrial 
strategy. In it the Commission notes cautiously, 
but rightly, that next to critical materials, reducing 
dependencies in “technologies, food, infra-
structure, security and other strategic area” is 
critical to economic security. The EU investment 
screening regulation, the EU 5G toolbox, and 
other financial and regulatory instruments to 
support EU strategic technologies are exemplary 
for a shift in EU policy to better operationalise 
economic security. 
 
ECONOMIC SECURITY AFTER CORONA 
Groundwork has been laid. But even for 
investment screening and a common 5G 
position, significant gaps remain across the 
Union. The corona crisis further demonstrates 
that the EU will require a more systematic 
approach to managing interdependence – one 
which preserves most of its benefits, while 
allowing to minimize risks.  
The turbulent corona times catapulted economic 
security to the front line. For example, new EU 
guidelines last week urged Member States that 
still lack a mechanism for vetting foreign 
investments to acquire one and do everything to 
prevent “loss of critical assets and technology.” 
Germany, meanwhile, set up a bailout fund to 
“temporarily” take over struggling German 
companies, before foreigners snatch up strategic 
assets. 
Things are moving unusually fast in a crisis. That 
is not necessarily good news. Getting economic 
security right requires more than shooting from 
the hip, even though the crisis currently demands 
it. It will require a methodology for the 
assessment of risk, calculation of advantage, and 
the availability of a defensive armour. 
The EU and Member States could, for example, 
more actively subsidise firms which want to 
reduce their dependency on China (a policy the 
Japanese government initiated). The experience 
from the critical raw materials strategy could 
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further help as framework how to coordinate 
external and internal instruments as well as R&D 
and financial instruments to address specific 
dependencies. 
If the silver lining of the corona crisis would 
amount to a more systematic EU approach to the 
question what dependencies we are willing to risk 
in an emergency, or a period of great power 
competition, the EU sailing boat would be better 
equipped to weather the currents. 
Interdependence is here to stay. How we manage 
it is what matters. 
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